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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION BY STATE
CONVENTION.-Two methods of ratifying amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States are provided for in Article V therein,'
but the mode exclusively employed up to and including the Twenti-
eth Amendment has been ratification by State Legislatures. The
"Repealer" 2 of the Prohibition Amendment recently proposed by
Congress, and submitted to the states for ratification, represents the
initial use of the second method: viz., ratification by conventions in
the several states.
Admitting no longer of any doubt, is the proposition that the
Constitution expresses the will of the people and not that of the
several states.3 From the people, through the Constitution, and only
through it, are federal powers derived, either expressly or impliedly.4
To the extent of the powers so delegated, the Federal Government
is supreme. 5 Quite naturally, the proposed amendment presented
the question---"Is Congress to dictate the formation of the conven-
tions?" Has that power been delegated to Congress, or, impliedly,
has reservation of it been made to the states?
The answer to the question is contained, directly or indirectly,
in the extremely broad and general terms of Article V of the Con-
' CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Art. V: "The Congress, whenever
two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments
to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of
the several States, shall call a convention for proposing Amendments, which, in
either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitu-
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or
by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratifi-
cation may be proposed by the Congress."
2 Joint Resolution of both Houses, February 20, 1933:
"Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each
house concurring therein)
"That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to
the Constitution of the United States which shall be valid to all intents
and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by conventions in
three-fourths of the several States:
"Sec. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi-
cating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
"Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by convention in-the several
States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date
of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress." (Italics ours.)
'Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816) ; Hawke v. Smith,
253 U. S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 495 (1920) ; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.
S. 316) 1819.
'Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 41 Sup. Ct. 510 (1921) ; Dodge v. Woolsey,
18 How. 331 (U. S. 1855) ; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, supra note 3.
rHawke v. Smith, supra note 3; M'Culloch v. Maryland, supra note 3;
Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4.
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stitution. If any power has been delegated, it must be found therein.
Congress, as the people's sole representative, is directed to propose
amendments whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, or "on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds
of the several states," and to determine the one or the other mode
of ratification; whether "by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof." 6
In forming the Constitution, the realization of the impossibility
and impracticability of specifying in detail each of the delegated
powers, together with the perils and dangers accompanying the same,
resulted in the people embodying therein fundamental principles and
general delegations of powers only.7 Not for- a limited existence,
but for ages, was the instrument created. Changes in conditions,
wrought by time, were unforeseeable; and, that specifications and
restrictions would present a serious and a constant menace to a
continuous existence was evident.8 What a hundred and fifty years
ago was expedient, is today obsolete and unusable, and, likewise,
what today is appropriate, is tomorrow discarded as worthless.
Necessarily, therefore, the Constitution does not go into detail, and
much depends upon implication. What is reasonably to be implied.
is as much a part of the Constitution, as that which is expressly
stated.9
Because legislatures are existent and determined representative
groups of the people, a choice of that mode results thereby in a
complete setting up of the ratification machinery. That, however,
is not so when conventions are concerned. Some agency is required
to create them. An extensive grant of power to Congress resides
in Article V.10 The President of the United States possesses no
'CONSTITUTION, Art. V, supra note 1; Dodge v. Woolsey, supra note 4,
"It is Supreme over the people of the United States aggregately and in their
separate sovereignties because they have excluded themselves from any direct
or immediate agency in making amendments to it, and have directed that
amendments should be made representatively for them, by the Congress of the
United States when two-thirds of both Houses shall propose them; or where
the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States shall call a convention for
proposing amendments, which in either case become valid, to all intents and
purposes, as a part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths of them,
as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress."
' Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4, at 376, "As a rule the Constitution speaks
in general terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as
the public interests and changing conditions require."
'Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, supra note 3.
' Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4; Drexel v. Bailey, 276 Fed. 452 (D. C. W. D.
N. C. 1921), aff'd, 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 445 (1925) ; Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, supra note 3, at 326, "Hence its powers are expressed in general terms,
leaving to the legislature to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects,
and to mold and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom and the
public interests should require."
" Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4, at 373, "An examination of Article V dis-
closes that it is intended to invest Congress with a wide range of power in
proposing amendments."
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right to veto a proposed amendment.1 A proper federal function
was the placing of a time limit for ratification of a proposed amend-
ment.12  Implications favor federal authority. Uniformity in rati-
fication is desirable 13 and can be gotten solely by federal action.
Complete control of proposing amendments and of selecting the
mode of ratification, unhampered by any express restrictions, is
given Congress.1 4 No claim of any power based upon an express
provision may be made by the states: "As the one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress" is language more
than sufficiently broad to justify congressional control of the entire
amendatory procedure. No limitations are placed upon congressional
powers therein found. In Congress has been vested the discretion
of determining which mode constitutes the more appropriate means
of realizing the general will of the people.15 Upon it rests the
burden of obtaining the people's sanction through truly representa-
tive assemblages. 16 That alone can represent the true import of the
article. To say that Congress has a choice between legislatures and
conventions is meaningless, if the formation of the conventions has
been impliedly reserved. Such an implication derogatory of federal
powers militates against the clear, unambiguous language of the su-
preme law of the country. Ratification might have been left to
popular vote or some means other than that selected, but that was
not desired.' 7
Hawke v. Smith,18 a case concerned with the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, is decisive of the question. Slightly more than twelve years
have elapsed since that decision, but in that short space of time it
has become recognized as an authority on ratification. The con-
stitution of the state of Ohio, the thirty-sixth state to signify as-
sent to that amendment, reserved to the people of that state the
right to adopt or reject the legislative act of ratification of a con-
stitutional amendment by a referendum. An injunction was sought
to restrain the Secretary of State from submitting the act of the
legislature to a popular vote. The Supreme Court held that the
framers of the Federal Constitution, clearly understanding the terms
of that instrument, had made the Federal Government the exclu-
sive, irrevocable agent for the people to amend; that the people and
the states, having assented to its provisions, could not alter or change
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (U. S. 1798).Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4.
Infra note 22.14Hawke v. Smith, supra note 3; Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4.
Dillon v. Gloss, supra note 4.
'6Ibid.; Hawke v. Smith, supra note 3, at 226, "Both methods of ratifica-
tion call -for action by deliberative assemblages representative of the people,
which it was assumed would voice the will of the people. The determination
of the method of ratification is the exercise of a national power specifically
granted by the Constitution; that power is conferred upon Congress."1 Hawke v. Smith, supra note 3.
' Ibid.
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the method selected by Congress.' 9 The act of the State Legisla-
ture, in ratifying or rejecting, is derived from the Federal Consti-
tution, and is a federal act as distinguished from an act of state
legislation,20 and as such not subject to challenge by the state or
its people.21 Similarly, the acts of the conventions represent the
exercise of a federal power. Since the acts are federal, of a like
nature are the conventions themselves. Their very existence is de-
pendent upon the will of Congress.
With a feeling of regret, is noticed the refusal of Congress
to exercise its implied power. Perhaps, motivated by a desire to
avoid litigation, it has resolved to remain passive. The wisdom of
so doing will soon be manifest. Uniformity of conventions will
be lacking.22 The ratification of the amendment is left to the slow.
impassive wills of state legislatures, 23 which, it is ventured, will
cause delay exceeding that which might have been occasioned by
any litigation. Moreover, an undesirable precedent has been
established.
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"
9Ibid.; National Prohibition Cases, 253. U S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 (1919).
2 Ibid. at 229, "* * * ratification by a state of a constitutional amendment
is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word."
' Hawke v. Smith, supra note 3; Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 137,
43 Sup. Ct. 217 (1921), "But the function of a state legislature in ratifying a
proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution, like the function of Congress
in proposing the Amendment, is a federal function derived from the Federal
Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the
people of a state."
' Hawke v. Smith, supra note 3, at 230, "Any other view might lead to
endless confusion in the manner of ratification of Federal Amendments. The
choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting action in
the several states."
'A. B. HART, EpocHs OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1925) 140, "The Federal
Convention was determined that the consideration of its work should not depend,
like the Articles of Confederation, upon the slow and unwilling humor of the
legislatures, but that in each State a convention should be summoned solely to
express the will of the State upon the acceptance of the Constitution."
